Microsoft Security

ROMHACK 2025

The Ultimate Guide for Protecting Hybrid Identities in Entra ID

Dr Nestori Syynimaa (@DrAzureAD)

Microsoft Threat Intelligence

Contents

Who am I?

- Dr Nestori Syynimaa (DrAzureAD)
- Principal Identity Security Researcher
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)

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@DrAzureAD

AADInternals

Hackers don’t break in, they log in

Corey Nachreiner

CSO, WatchGuard

Identity attacks in perspective

Password-based attacks continue to dominate, but can be thwarted by using strong authentication methods.

More than 99% of identity attacks are password attacks

- Breach replay
- Password spray
- Phishing

Rely on predictable human behaviors such as selecting easy-to-guess passwords, reusing them on multiple websites, and falling prey to phishing attacks.

<1% of attacks

Less than 1% combined

MFA attacks

- SIM swapping
- MFA fatigue
- AitM

End-run MFA protection by intercepting security codes using stolen phone numbers, barraging users with MFA notifications until they approve, and capturing first and second factor credentials using fake replicas of legitimate websites.

Post-authentication attacks

- Token theft
- Consent phishing

Infiltrate a user's account after they authenticate by stealing a legitimate token created on their device and moving it to a device under the attacker's control, by searching source code repositories for Open Authorization (OAuth) tokens and other non-human credentials, or by tricking the authenticated user into granting permissions to malicious apps.

Infrastructure compromise

Often silently executed by professional groups or nation-state-backed threat actors with sophisticated operations, making them very hard to detect. Threat actors may compromise an on-premises federation server and copy its private signing key to forge tokens, compromise a privileged cloud user and add new federation contracts, or compromise a non-human workload identity and create new credentials with elevated privileges.

Source: Microsoft Threat Intelligence

https://www.microsoft.com/en-gb/security/security-insider/intelligence-reports/microsoft-digital-defense-report-2024

Hybrid Authentication Options



Source: Secureworks

* Supports seamless single sign-on

(Hybrid) Cloud Security



Source: Secureworks

Biggest problem with network defense is that defenders think in lists. Attackers think in graphs.

As long as this is true, attackers win.

John Lambert

Corporate Vice President, Security Fellow, Microsoft

Entra Connect Sync



Entra Cloud Connect

- Synchronises objects between Entra ID and on-premises AD
- Uses Entra ID *user* or *application* identity

Entra Connect Sync attack graph



* Admin Web Service

Entra Connect Sync attack graph



* Admin Web Service

2. Access to secret



* https://specterops.io/blog/2025/06/09/update-dumping-entra-connect-sync-credentials/

2. Access to secret



3. Access to services



* Workload identities https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/workload-id/workload-identities-overview

4. Access to Entra ID



Protecting Entra ID Connect Sync

Area	Action
Limit access to server	Limit number of local administrators, POLP[1]
Limit access to secret	Use application identity with TPM[2]
Limit access to services	Use Conditional Access Policy to limit access, requires Workload Identities for application identity[3]
Limit access to Entra ID	Block all soft and hard match[4] features, POLP

1. Principle Of Least Privilege
2. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/authenticate-application-id
3. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/workload-id/workload-identities-overview
4. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/hybrid/connect/how-to-connect-syncservice-features

Entra Cloud Sync



Entra Cloud Sync

- Synchronises objects between Entra ID and on-premises AD
- Uses certificate based authentication (CBA)

Entra Cloud Sync attack graph (overview)



* Hybrid Identity Service

Entra Cloud Sync attack graph (overview)



* Hybrid Identity Service

Protecting & mitigating Entra Cloud Sync

Area	Action
Limit access to server	Limit number of local administrators, POLP[1]
Prevent access to services	Delete configuration[2] Contact Microsoft support to delete compromised agent(s)
Prevent access to Entra ID	Disable or remove *ADToAADSyncServiceAccount*

1. Principle Of Least Privilege
2. https://portal.azure.com/#view/Microsoft_AAD_Connect_Provisioning/CloudSyncMenuBlade/~/CloudSyncConfigurations

Pass-Through Authentication



Pass-Through Authentication (PTA)

- Verifies credentials against on-premises AD
- Uses certificate based authentication (CBA)

PTA attack graph



* Hybrid Identity Service

PTA attack graph



* Hybrid Identity Service

Protecting & mitigating PTA attacks

Area	Action
Limit access to server	Limit number of local administrators, POLP[1]
Prevent access to services	Disable PTA Contact Microsoft support to delete compromised agent(s)

1. Principle Of Least Privilege

Federated Identity



Federated Identity

- Verifies credentials against external Identity Provider (IdP)
- Entra ID accepts tokens signed with IdP’s private key

Federated Identity attack graph



* OAuth, SAML, WS-FED, etc.

Federated Identity attack graph



* OAuth, SAML, WS-FED, etc.

AD FS attack graph



AD FS attack graph



Accessing AD FS token signing certificate



TPM: Trusted Platform Module
HSM: Hardware Security Module

Accessing AD FS token signing certificate



Exploiting trust



Exploiting trust



Protecting Identity Federation

Area	Action
Limit access to server	Limit number of local administrators, POLP[1]
Limit access to AD FS certificate	Use custom certificates Store certificate on TPM or HSM
Limit trust	Set **federatedIdpMfaBehavior** to **rejectMfaByFederatedIdp**[2] Set **federatedTokenValidationPolicy**'s **validatingDomains** to **all**[3]

1. Principle Of Least Privilege
2. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/internaldomainfederation
3. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/federatedtokenvalidationpolicy

Exchange Hybrid



Exchange Hybrid

- Enables email routing between on-prem and Exchange Online
- Enables sharing free/busy time
- Etc.

Exchange hybrid attack graph



* Hybrid Identity Service

Exchange hybrid attack graph



Exploiting actor token



* Exchange Web Services

Exploiting actor token





Protecting Hybrid Exchange

Area	Action
Limit access to server	Limit number of local administrators, POLP[1]
Limit access to certificate	Store certificate on TPM or HSM
Stop using Exchange Online SP	Deploy dedicated Exchange hybrid app[2]

1. Principle Of Least Privilege
2. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/hybrid-deployment/deploy-dedicated-hybrid-app

Microsoft Security

GRAZIE MILLE!

Questions?